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 Planning for the future may encourage apparently ‘impulsive’ behaviour when the 
future is anticipated to be bleak. Thus, a seeming failure of self-control in reactive violence 
could be caused not by a disinclination to plan ahead, but by virtue of this ability. 
Furthermore, we point to empirical and theoretical shortcomings in the authors’ case, such as 
a failure to distinguish proximate and ultimate explanations.  
 
Using foresight to prioritise the present 
 
In their target article, Van Lange (VL) et al. argue that cooler temperatures and greater 
seasonal variation encourage future planning and self-control in countries further from the 
equator, leading to reduced reactive violence. VL et al. draw together research from 
evolutionary, social and cognitive psychology in pursuit of an integrative model. However, 
we do not find their model compelling. Firstly, we point out an alternative role for explicit 
mental planning. Secondly, we note that the authors are not clear what kind of explanation 
they advance and thus what predictions the model makes. Finally, we note some apparent 
inconsistencies and empirical holes in their argument.  
 
While people vary in their tendency to make future-oriented decisions (Kirby, Petry, & 
Bickel, 1999; Zimbardo, Keough, & Boyd, 1997), the capacity to travel mentally in time is a 
universal human ability among healthy adults with undeniable adaptive advantages 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). The ability to imagine future situations and organise current 
actions accordingly has been called episodic foresight (Suddendorf & Moore, 2011). People 
frequently rely on episodic foresight when making various kinds of decisions (e.g., Gilbert & 
Wilson, 2007), including, as VL et al. acknowledge, social ones (e.g., Boyer, 2008). VL et al. 
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note that: “The anticipation of future interaction is a powerful determinant of unselfish and 
cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas” (p28). Indeed, as economists and psychologists 
have realised, the anticipated costs of antisocial behaviours can reduce a propensity for so-
called ‘short-sighted’ or ‘impulsive’ social transgressions, like stealing or aggression that 
may accrue immediate benefits—for instance in terms of material wealth or status (Boyer, 
2008; Frank, 1988).  
 
Thus, one of the reasons humans avoid reactive violence is because the delayed interpersonal 
costs of doing so can be foreseen. However, we think the role of mental time travel into the 
future does not end here. It may have the opposite effect when people imagine futures that are 
volatile, uncertain, or harsh. In those circumstances, delayed relational and coalitional costs 
of immediate violence may be downplayed because they are foreseen as less likely to 
materialise, or less dramatic against the harsh backdrop of one’s expected future (see 
Bolland, 2003; Brezina, Tekin, & Topalli, 2009). For this reason, a seeming ‘failure’ of self-
control in reactive violence may sometimes be caused not by a disinclination to plan ahead, 
as Van Lange et al. imply, but by very virtue of this ability. In other words, prudent foresight, 
in certain circumstances, should lead to a general prioritisation of the present (Bulley, Henry, 
& Suddendorf, 2016; see also Daly & Wilson, 2005). 
 
A second concern is that it is not clear what reasons the authors propose for the apparent links 
between average temperature/ seasonal variation and life history, time perspective, self-
control and aggression. Are the purported relationships driven by explicit mental reasoning 
(as discussed above), individual learning, cultural evolution, an evolved genetic 
predisposition or calibration mechanism, or some combination of these factors? At times VL 
et al. point to individual reasoning and foresight, for instance when they write that individuals 
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“realize that they need to plan and prepare for the next season” (p21). At other times, they 
appeal to evolutionary adaptation or developmental plasticity: “average temperature and 
seasonal variation in temperature have shaped the evolution and development of differential 
adaptation in terms of life strategy, time-orientation, and self-control.” (p27). And yet 
elsewhere, they seem to appeal to cultural evolution: “lower temperatures and especially 
greater seasonal variation in temperature helps individuals and societies evolve as less 
aggressive…” (p17; all emphases added). 
 
Aside from inappropriately framing evolutionary processes in terms of goal directedness (e.g. 
that the environment “helps” people to evolve in a certain way), such statements fail to 
carefully delineate proximate (mechanistic/developmental) and ultimate 
(phylogenetic/functional) explanations, a practice which is critical when making evolutionary 
arguments (Mayr, 1961; Tinbergen, 1963). Given the potentially socially divisive nature of 
some possible interpretations of VL et al.’s propositions, it seems particularly important to be 
clear about what kind of explanation the authors advance and hence what predictions follow 
that could be put to the test (e.g., if their proposed explanation is at the phylogenetic level, it 
could be tested with genetic, or twin studies).  
 
The authors also apply their argument inconsistently. They do not adequately explain why 
seasonal temperature variation should encourage planning more than other important 
predictable environmental stressors. For example, many hot countries north of the equator are 
subject to seasonably variable, but reasonably predictable, precipitation (Brown & Lall, 
2006), leading to significant water stress (Oki & Kanae, 2006), a fact that VL et al. 
acknowledge (pp15-16). Nonetheless, they choose not to focus on the effects of variability in 
rainfall, reasoning that; 1) the effects of temperature have been more thoroughly examined in 
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the literature, 2) the associations between temperature and conflict appear to be stronger than 
those between rainfall and conflict, and 3) for most countries, temperature varies more 
predictably than rainfall. Whilst these might be good reasons to focus on the effects of 
temperature variability, they are not good reasons to ignore other climatic variables, which, 
by applying the authors’ logic, should be important. In avoiding discussion of the effects of 
rainfall, as well as other variables, VL et al. fail to answer a key question: Why shouldn’t the 
predictable stressors of hot climates also engender planning and self-control as per the 
predictable stressors of cooler climates?  
 
There is a risk that ambiguous reasoning, aired in an esteemed journal such as this, will play 
into the hands of old racist prejudices about evolved inferiority of certain peoples. So we 
want to end this commentary with a warning that, in addition to the theoretical shortcomings 
already discussed, there are large empirical holes in the authors’ case. For example, the target 
article avoids adequate consideration of the historical contexts of the regions in question (e.g. 
the profound consequences of slavery and colonisation for equatorial countries; see Diamond, 
1999). They also sidestep potential counter-examples from near the equator (e.g., the 
peaceful nature of places such as Singapore; The World Bank, 2013), from history (e.g., the 
simultaneous planning successes and extreme violence of ancient Mesoamerican societies; 
see Harner, 1977), and from prehistory (e.g. that the extended time perspective characteristic 
of our species arguably began to evolve in African savannah-dwelling hominins; see 
McBrearty & Brooks, 2000; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).   
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